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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
action," it was of the opinion that the facts warranted equitable
relief against the constructively fraudulent transfer of the debtor's
property into the hands of the former shareholders, so an equi-
table lien was impressed thereon for plaintiff's benefit. That
decision accords both with the general rule9 and some earlier
Illinois cases'0 on the subject of creditors' rights. The novelty
of the case, if there is any, lies in the use of the modern declaratory
judgment procedure as a substitute for the old-fashioned creditor's
bill with its attendant formalities.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Significant cases in the field of criminal law divide about
equally into those dealing with substantive issues and those con-
cerning procedural points. In the first of these categories, men-
tion might be made of the fact that the 1874 statute, which pro-
hibits the unlawful possession of burglar's tools,' was construed
for the first time this year by the Supreme Court through the
medium of the case of People v. Taylor.2  The defendant, an
unemployed handyman, was arrested by police on suspicion while
walking through a neighborhood where burglaries had been fre-
quent. In his pocket at the time were a pair of pliers, a screw-
driver, and a pencil flashlight. He was convicted for a violation
of the statute in the trial court and the Supreme Court, on writ
of error, had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
tools possessed by the defendant came within the statutory pro-
hibition. The conviction was reversed, however, on the ground
the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to support
an inference regarding the presence of the necessary felonious
intention. The holding in People v. Beacham3 was distinguished
8 See 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, § 529.
9 First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 54 S. Ct. 298, 78 L. Ed. 465, 90
A. L. R. 391 (1934); Bankers Trust Co. v. Kilburn, 84 F. (2d) 401 (1936) ; South
Chester Tube Co. v. Naismith, 73 F. (2d) 13 (1934).
10 Bouton v. Smith, 113 11. 481 (1885); Dunphy v. Gorman, 29 Ill. App. 132
(1888).
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 87.
2410 Il. 469, 102 N. E. (2d) 529 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw
278.
3 358 I1. 373, 193 N. E. 205 (1934).
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as the case there lacked the elements of plausible explanation,
consistent testimony, and witness corroboration which character-
ized the instant case.
The common-law rule that a husband and wife, being one
person, cannot alone be convicted of conspiracy, was offered for
reconsideration by the Appellate Court for the First District in
People v. Estep.4 The defendant and his wife had been convicted
with two others and, on writ of error transferred,5 the common-
law rule was argued inter alia in their behalf. Although the
question had not been decided in any prior Illinois criminal case,
two civil cases purport to follow the common-law rule.6  The
prosecution argued that the common-law rule had ceased to oper-
ate as it could no longer be said that a wife lacks separate legal
existence. The reviewing court declined to decide the question so
argued by both parties, and quite properly affirmed the conviction,
on the ground of a common-law exception which permitted the
husband and wife to be convicted when they conspired with
others.
One judicial decision effected a salutary change in the law
relating to the manner of determining guilt under a charge of
indirect contempt. A direct contempt may be punished summar-
ily without issuance of a rule to show cause and without the
hearing of evidence, but a proceeding to punish for an indirect
contempt requires information, notice, citation or rule to show
cause, and a hearing, since the alleged contemptuous conduct
occurs out of the judge's presence and extrinsic evidence of the
fact would be necessary. In such cases, the Illinois courts have
consistently followed the rule that the defendant's sworn answer,
denying the wrongful acts charged, is conclusive, and evidence
may not be received to impeach the same. On such an answer,
the defendant heretofore would be entitled to be discharged and
4346 Ill. App. 132, 104 N. E. (2d) 562 (1952).
5 See People v. Estep, 409 Ill. 125, 97 N. E. (2d) 823 (1951).
6 Worthy v. Birk, 224 Ili. App. 574 (19=); Merrill v. Marshall, 113 Ill. App. 447
(1904). In the last mentioned case, an action for slander, the court held that a
statement that a husband and wife had conspired to cheat and defraud was not
per 8C slanderous as a charge of. crime, since a husband and wife could not be
indicted for conspiracy.
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the only remedy against him would be a prosecution for perjury
for having made a false answer. 7
The rule that a sworn answer purges the defendant of an
indirect contempt was argued in favor of defendants in several
cases during the year, being avoided by the court in one case,"
applied in another,9 but was finally renounced in the case of
People v. Gholson,° so as to bring about an overruling of all
previous decisions on the point. In that case, Judge Maxwell, for
the Supreme Court, emphasized the point that the guilt of the
contemnor and the violation of the court's dignity were the same
in cases of direct and indirect contempt, hence the court should
have, within limits of due process, the same power to secure an
orderly conduct of its affairs in both cases. The contempt power
having proved ineffectual in every case of indirect contempt where
the contemnor was willing to take the "usually slight risk" of
conviction for perjury, it was thought best to abolish the doctrine
of purgation by oath as an impediment to the orderly and im-
partial administration of justice. Referring to Mr. Justice
Holmes' condemnation of the rule as a "fragment of a system of
proof which does not prevail in theory or as a whole,"'" the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the time had come "to
renounce the doctrine altogether and stamp out its dying em-
bers. ',12
Two criminal statutes were challenged on constitutional
grounds. The validity of the "reckless homicide" act,13 adopted
in 1949, was sustained by the Supreme Court in People v. Gar-
7 Earlier cases are cataloged in the opinion in People v. Ryan, 412 Ill. 54 at 58,
104 N. E. (2d) 821 at 823 (1952).
8 People v. Ryan, 410 Ill. 486, 103 N. E. (2d) 116 (1951). The court affirmed the
contempt conviction of a defendant for refusal to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum, saying that it is not just any answer which will purge the witness, but only
an answer which states facts sufficient in law to excuse him from responding.
9 People v. Ryan, 412 Ill. 54, 104 N. E. (2d) 821 (1952). The same defendant as
the one mentioned in note 8, ante, was held purged by a sworn answer stating facts
sufficient to excuse him from obeying a subpoena ad testiflcandum.
'0 412 Ill. 294, 106 N. E. (2d) 333 (1952).
11 See United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563 at 574, 27 S. Ct. 165 at 167, 51 L. Ed.
319 at 324 (1906).
12412 Ill. 294 at 301, 106 N. E. (2d) 333 at 337.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 364a.
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man.14 It was there argued, on behalf of the defendant, that the
statute was so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to violate his
right to due process of law.15 The court, adhering to the rule
that the legislature describes a new crime with sufficient clarity
when it uses words having an established common law meaning, 16
and on finding that the statutory phrase "reckless disregard of
the rights and safety of others" possessed a definite common law
meaning, achieved the conclusion there had been no violation of
constitutional requirements. In People v. Levin,'7 however, the
Supreme Court declared Section 19 of the Illinois version of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act,'8 one which declares it to be a
felony for the "trustee" to fail to pay over the money received,
to be unconstitutional on the ground the subject matter thereof,
that is the criminal penalty, was not revealed in the title of the
act.' 9
Most disconcerting, from the procedural standpoint, was the
action taken by the Supreme Court in the case of People ex rel.
Jones v. Robinson.20 In that case, the court declared that an
original habeas corpus petition which presented a fact question
would not be considered notwithstanding a constitutional provi-
sion which allocates, to that very court, original jurisdiction over
writs of habeas corpus 1.2  The court said that it was foreclosed
from determining the issues of fact presented, thereby denying
to the prisoner a right accorded to him by the constitution to
choose the tribunal in which to file his petition, but it advanced
no cogent reasons for dismissing the proceeding. Persons engaged
in seeking constitutional reforms could well take note of this
holding.
14411 Ill. 279, 103 N. E. (2d) 636 (1952).
15 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
16 People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N. E. (2d) 278, 115 A. L. R. 348 (1938).
17412 Ill. 11, 104 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
387.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 183.
19 The statute was said to violate Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
20409 1ll. 553, 101 N. E. (2d) 100 (1951), criticized In 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 282.
21 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2.
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It is common practice, in return for aid furnished, to strike
an indictment with leave to reinstate, but that fact, according to
the decision in People v. Bryant,22 does not serve to discharge the
other of two alleged conspirators so jointly indicted. The de-
fendant there argued that an order striking the indictment as to
a co-defendant, even with leave to reinstate, had operated as a
discharge of such defendant, thereby necessitating the discharge
of the defendant himself under a well-established rule that a
single person cannot be held for a conspiracy. 23 The argument
was based on a rule followed in some states 24 to the effect that a
nolle prosequi as to one conspirator requires the discharge of the
other since it renders the indictment inoperative. 25  The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, had no difficulty in distinguishing the
defendant's authorities on the basis that, while an unconditional
nolle prosequi may terminate the proceedings, an order striking
the indictment with leave to reinstate possesses no such operative
effect. 26 The decision might well have been expected inasmuch
as the court had already decided that a granting of immunity to
one alleged co-conspirator was not an acquittal, hence afforded no
reason for the discharge of the other.
27
A defendant's right to be present at the trial of his case may
be prejudiced by a judge's communication with the jury after it
has retired and in the absence of the defendant. Whether that
fact will warrant reversal of a conviction, in the absence of a
showing that such communication was prejudicial to the defend-
ant, came up for consideration in the case of People v. Tilley.
2s
The jury there deliberated all night when the judge inquired
22409 Ill. 467, 100 N. E. (2d) 598 (1951), affirming 342 11. App. 90, 95 N. E. (2d)
620 (1950).
23 People v. LaBow, 282 Ill. 227, 118 N. E. 395 (1917).
24 The cases have been collected in annotations appearing in 72 A. L. R. 1180 and
97 A. L. IE. 1312.
25 No Illinois court, apparently, had ever decided whether one alleged conspirator
must be discharged when the charge against the other has been modified either by
an unconditional nolle prosequi or by an order unconditionally striking the indict-
ment as to him.
26 People v. Kidd, 357 Ill. 133, 191 N. E. 244 (1934).
27 People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 193 N. E. 150 (1934).
28 411 II. 473, 104 N. E. (2d) 499 (1952). Bristow, J., wrote a dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Maxwell, J.
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whether there was any hope that a verdict might be reached.
Upon the jurors' request for further information, the judge stated
he could give no new instructions except in the presence of the
attorneys and the defendant but, in response to a question by
one juror, he replied that the defendant had specifically denied
committing the crime. Upon review, a majority of the Supreme
Court found no prejudice had occurred and, following the holding
in People v. Brothers,29 rejected an argument offered in the
defendant's behalf to the effect that any communication whatso-
ever between judge and jury, in the absence of the defendant,
would entitle the latter to a new trial 0  A dissenting opinion,
after a careful review of all Illinois cases, pointed out that, in a]]
cases prior to the Brothers decision, on which the majority had
relied, the court had adhered to a strict rule against secret judge-
jury communications; that the Brothers case was based on a
misunderstanding of the extent to which the earlier cases had
safeguarded the defendant's right to be present at his trial; and
that attempted distinctions which the court had made were insub-
stantial.31 In view of this vigorous challenge, serious doubts may
be entertained as to the durability of the rule laid down in the
Brothers case and in the instant case. With due regard for the
finality of a Supreme Court decision, it would seem that clarifica-
tion would be helpful.
The holding in People v. Ferguson32 may be said to overrule
29 347 II. 530, 180 N. E. 442 (1932).
30 At 411 Ill. 473 at 478-9, 104 N. E. (2d) 499 at 502, the court approved a state-
ment made in the opinion in the Brothers case to the effect that privacy "of jury
deliberations should be zealously protected against invasion, but the cardinal test
on a motion to set aside a verdict on that ground is whether or not the invasion
was calculated to influence the verdict of a jury. If it was not so calculated, it
would be idle to disturb a verdict. Often it is practically Impossible to prevent a
juror from communicating with a judge, as when he approaches the judge and asks
permission to telephone his family or to say that he is sick. Surely such harmless
communications of themselves are an insufficient excuse for setting aside a verdict
or reversing a judgment."
31 By way of emphasis, the dissenters urged that no inquiry should be permitted
into the question whether the defendant had been Injured by the interview for if
"the court is permitted to talk with the jury in the jury room in the absence of the
defendant, then the defendant has no knowledge of what was said or done and
would be at a disadvantage in proving that something improper took place . . . It
surely is against the policy of law in this State to impose upon a defendant in a
criminal proceeding such a burden." See 411 Ill. 473 at 486-7, 104 N. E. 49.q at
506.
32410 Ill. 87, 101 N. E. (2d) 522 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 417.
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the former case law concerning consecutive sentences, as set forth
in People v. Nicholso, 33 at least insofar as that case could be
said to be inconsistent with the instant decision. The defendant
there was convicted for burglary and sentenced on May 2, 1935.
He was subsequently convicted on another charge of burglary and
sentenced thereon on May 27, 1935. The judgment order in the
second case commanded, inter alia, that the Department of Public
Welfare should confine the defendant "from and after" delivery
but added that "the said imprisonment shall begin at the expira-
tion of the sentence of imprisonment of the said Sterling Fergu-
son entered the second day of May, A. D. 1935, in cause No.
75757." Under the former rule, if a judgment order was incon-
sistent or repugnant within itself on the point as to whether the
sentence should be concurrent or consecutive, it was held that the
sentence, as a matter of law, had to run concurrently with other
sentences. Despite some admitted conflict in the language of the
judgment order, the Supreme Court decided that the quoted
words adequately expressed an intention that the sentences should
run consecutively, hence the order was not defectively ambiguous.
Dealing with the case on its own merits and refusing to interpret
the language of the judgment order under an ironclad rule of
law, the court recognized a conflict between its holding and the
rule announced in the Nicholson case so it expressly declared that
case overruled.
Another sentencing problem was generated in the case of
People v. Westbrook34 where, after verdict and judgment of
guilty on an indictment for armed robbery, a crime calling for an
indeterminate sentence, the defendant was given a maximum and
minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Notwithstanding an
argument by the prosecution that such a sentence was literally
correct, 35 the court held the punishment to be, in effect, a definite
33 404 Ill. 122, 87 N. E. (2d) 15 (1949).
84411 Ill. 301, 103 N. E. (2d) 494 (1952), noted in 32 Bost. L. Rev. 349.
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Oh. 38, § 802, provides in part: "The minimum limit
fixed by the court may be greater but shall not be less than the minimum term
provided by law for the offense and the maximum limit fixed by the court may be
less but shall not be greater than the maximum term provided by law therefor."
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one and invalid as opposed to the legislative purpose to require
an indefinite and flexible sentence within prescribed limits.
Some cases also dealt with aspects of the right to secure re-
view of trial court determinations in criminal cases. The Appel-
late Court for the First District, for example, in People v. Collis,86
held that a defendant who had requested, and had been granted,
probation was thereby deemed to have waived his right to a
review of his conviction. Numerous cases in other jurisdictions,
as well as an analogous Illinois decision in People v. Andrae
37
dealing with the effect to be given a petition for release on proba-
tion, support the decision affirming the conviction.
Limitations exist upon the State's right to sue out a writ of
error in criminal cases 8 but, according to People v. Moore,3 9 such
limitations will not be permitted to inhibit state powers to secure
law enforcement through civil proceedings. Gaming apparatus
and money of the defendant had there been seized under a search
warrant, but a county court order had suppressed the search
warrant and had directed the return of the property so taken.
Upon direct appeal by the state, the defendant argued that the
right of the state to sue out a writ of error did not extend to
permit review of an order such as the one there involved. The
Supreme Court agreed with the defendant but it added that the
order of the county court had a double aspect. Insofar as the
order holding the search warrant to be void was an incident to a
criminal proceeding, the state had no right to a writ of error.
But the order was also effective in determining property rights,
i. e. whether the property seized was contraband, so the action
was held to be a proceeding in rem, civil in nature and attended
36 344 Ill. App. 539, 101 N. E. (2d) 739 (1951).
37 295 Il1. 445, 129 N. E. 178 (1920). It was there held that, under the act pro-
viding for a system of probation by which a convicted person could be admitted to
probation when "nothing remains to be done by the court except to pronounce
sentence," a prisoner's filing of a petition for release on probation was evidence
that he accepted the plea or verdict of guilty as final, hence had no right to move
in arrest of judgment.
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 747.
39 410 Ill. 241, 102 N. E. (2d) 146 (1951).
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by the right of appeal. Review was, therefore, limited to that
aspect of the case.
40
Reviewability of a commitment order under the "criminal
sexual psychopath" law41 was considered in People v. Ross. 42
The plaintiff in error sought review before the Supreme Court
but that tribunal, finding it had no jurisdiction, transferred the
case to the Appellate Court for the Second District.43 By analogy
to People v. CorneliUs,44 decided under one of the sections dealing
with insane persons, 45 the Appellate Court found that the order
of commitment was interlocutory, hence not reviewable. It was
also there suggested that, inasmuch as the statute made no pro-
vision for review, a reviewing court would have no jurisdiction in
such a case and could only dismiss the writ of error. If the
alleged sexual psychopath is to be denied bail pending a hearing46
and may not have review of a commitment order, there is evident
reason why the legislature should re-examine the statute to pre-
vent a forfeiture of liberty.
A decision of utmost significance in the law of Illinois crimi-
nal procedure came from the hands of the Illinois Supreme Court
in People v. Jennings,47 a case explaining the operation of the
1949 Post Conviction Act 4s and avoiding a construction thereof
which would have resulted in making the statute into just another
blind alley in the Illinois "merry-go-round" concerning review in
criminal cases. Petitioners, imprisoned in the penitentiary for
40 The court there refused to pass on the question whether some $18,000 in cur-
rency, seized during the raid, could be considered as contraband as the issue of
whether or not it had formed a functional integral part of a gambling operation
had not been passed on by the trial court. On that point, see the later holding of
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District in People v. Wrest, 345 Il1. App. 186,
103 N. H. (2d) 171 (1952).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 820-5.
42344 Ill. App. 407, 101 N. E. (2d) 112 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RvrIEw 59 and 1952 Ill. L. Forum 157.
43 407 I1. 199, 95 N. E. (2d) 61 (1950).
44 332 Ii. App. 271, 74 N. E. (2d) 900 (1947).
45 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 593.
46 See discussion of Application of Keddy, 105 Cal. App. (2d) 215, 233 P. (2d)
159 (1951), in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 160.
47411 Ill. 21, 102 N. E. (2d) 824 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 413 and 46 Ill. L.
Rev. 900.
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 826-32.
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individual offenses, had sought hearings under the statute alleg-
ing that they had suffered a denial of federal constitutional rights
in that confessions had been improperly obtained from them.
The state's attorney moved to dismiss the petition in each case on
the ground the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata
and the petitions had not alleged facts sufficient to state a cause
of action. The motions were sustained and the several petitions
were dismissed without further hearing. The Illinois Supreme
Court also dismissed review without hearing or opinion, but the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In that forum, the Illinois Attorney General argued that the
Post Conviction Hearing Act did not provide an appropriate
remedy for the consideration of those claims which were or could
have been adjudicated at the trial of the case. Refusing to accept
this view, the United States Supreme Court said: "We do not
lightly assume that a state has failed to provide any post-convic-
tion remedy if a defendant is imprisoned in violation of constitu-
tional rights. Accordingly we consider it appropriate that the
Illinois Supreme Court be permitted to provide definite answers
to the questions of state law raised by these cases. . . . If Illinois
does not provide an appropriate remedy for such a determination,
petitioners may proceed without more in the United States Dis-
trict Court." 49 The Illinois Supreme Court then wrote its explana-
tory opinion, holding that the Post Conviction Hearing Act does
provide an appropriate remedy for assertion of claims by indigent
defendants that their constitutional rights have been denied them.
It also indicated that the doctrine of res judicata is not to be
applied mechanically to foreclose inquiry into the merits of such
claims but rather the inquiry "must be made even though it in-
volves a collateral attack upon a judgment which the court had
jurisdiction and authority to enter." 50
By so holding, the court avoided a return to the hopeless legal
situation which confronted a prisoner before enactment of the
49 See Jennings v. State of Illinois, 342 U. S. 104 at 111-2, 72 S. Ct. 123 at 127,
96 L. Ed. (adv.) 105 at 110 (1951).
50411 Ill. 21 at 25, 102 N. E. (2d) 824 at 826.
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statute, when the only state remedies seemed to be the three blind
alleys of habeas corpus, 51 writ of error,5 2 and writ of error coram
nobis. 53  The opinion, however, discloses two possible limitations
upon the prisoner's right to review. In the first place, the court
does not foreclose consideration of a former adjudication as evi-
dence on the question as to whether defendant's constitutional
rights have been infringed; it merely holds that the former
adjudication shall not be conclusive. Secondly, the defendant
may have "waived" his constitutional rights, either by failure to
assert them at the trial, where opportunity was had, or by failing
to seek review of a decision adverse to his claim, as where the
prisoner is financially unable to obtain the transcript necessary
for an effective review on writ of error. Legislation providing
for a prompt, inexpensive, full and adequate review of every
felony conviction might yet be the only real solution.
V. FAMILY LAW
Although there is little new in the law concerning marriage,'
some matters regarding divorce call for attention. In Elston v.
Elston,2 for example, the well-established doctrine of recrimination
was applied by the court, acting as representative of the state's
interest in the preservation of the marriage relation, despite the
51 That remedy, in Illinois, is appropriate only to test the Jurisdiction of the
court in which petitioner was tried: People v. Bradley, 391 Ill. 169, 62 N. E. (2d)
788 (1945). There is no right to an appeal and the Illinois Supreme Court will not
entertain original proceedings which present a fact question: People ex rel. Jones
v. Robinson, 409 Ill. 553, 101 N. E. (2d) 100 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KEqT LAW
RWviEw 282.
52 As an indigent defendant cannot afford to pay for a stenographic transcript of
the trial proceedings, review by way of writ of error is, to all practical effect,
confined to the common law record, that is to the indictment, the arraignment,
the entry of the plea, the fact of a trial, and the verdict and judgment thereon.
The writ of error, under such circumstance, is ineffective to review alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights, except those which may be revealed on the face of the
common law record.
53 The statutory writ of error coram nobis, based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 196, permits the presentation only of those questions of fact unknown
at the time of trial. It is clearly unsuitable to fit the typical situation.
1 The case of Whelan v. Whelan, 346 Ill. App. 445, 105 N. E. (2d) 314 (1952),
might be mentioned as it represents the first clear-cut application of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 89, § 19 et seq., to a marriage
performed elsewhere, but which would have been void if performed in Illinois,
between first cousins.
2344 111. App. 233, 100 N. E. (2d) 635 (1951), noted in 15 U. of Det. L. J. 156.
